

DOCUMENT I: *CITIZENS UNITED v. F.E.C.*, 2010

The F.E.C. has adopted 568 pages of regulations, 1,278 pages of explanations and justifications for those regulations, and 1,771 advisory opinions since 1975. ... given the complexity of the regulations and the deference courts show to administrative determinations, a speaker who wants to avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against F.E.C. enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior permission to speak.

If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech. All speakers, including individuals and the media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting speech.

At the founding, speech was open, comprehensive, and vital to society's definition of itself; there were no limits on the sources of speech and knowledge....By suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests. Factions will necessarily form in our Republic, but the remedy of 'destroying the liberty' of some factions is 'worse than the disease' [*Federalist 10*]. Factions should be checked by permitting them all to speak, and by entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false...

When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.

The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate. The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials.

Rapid changes in technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers. Today, 30-second television ads may be the most effective way to convey a political message. Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources ... will provide citizens with significant information about political candidates and issues. Yet, [the BCRA] would seem to ban a blog post expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate if that blog were created with corporate funds. The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political speech.

1. Why does the Court say that current F.E.C. regulations results in citizens needing "permission to speak"?
2. Why does the Court say that "The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves"?
3. The Court reasoned, "The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy." Do you agree? What effect, if any, does this ruling have on the republican principle of the United States government?

[In] a variety of contexts, we have held that speech can be regulated differentially on account of the speaker's identity, when identity is understood in categorical or institutional terms. The Government routinely places special restrictions on the speech rights of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and its own employees.

Unlike our colleagues, the Framers had little trouble distinguishing corporations from human beings, and when they constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind. ... [M]embers of the founding generation held a cautious view of corporate power and a narrow view of corporate rights... and...they conceptualized speech in individualistic terms. If no prominent Framers bothered to articulate that corporate speech would have lesser status than individual speech, that may well be because the contrary proposition—if not also the very notion of "corporate speech"—was inconceivable.

On numerous occasions we have recognized Congress's legitimate interest in preventing the money that is spent on elections from exerting an 'undue influence on an officeholder's judgment' and from creating 'the appearance of such influence.' Corruption operates along a spectrum, and the majority's apparent belief that quid pro quo arrangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper influences does not accord with the theory or reality of politics....A democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being bought and sold.

A regulation such as BCRA may affect the way in which individuals disseminate certain messages through the corporate form, but it does not prevent anyone from speaking in his or her own voice.

At bottom, the Court's opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining self-government since the founding, and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange time to repudiate that common sense. While American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics.

1. How does the reasoning in the dissenting opinion differ from that of the Majority (Document I)?
2. How would you evaluate the dissenters statement, "A democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being bought and sold."

DOCUMENT K: CONCURRING OPINION, CITIZENS UNITED v. F.E.C., 2010

The Framers didn't like corporations, the dissent concludes, and therefore it follows (as might the day) that corporations had no rights of free speech.

The lack of a textual exception for speech by corporations cannot be explained on the ground that such organizations did not exist or did not speak. To the contrary...both corporations and voluntary associations actively petitioned the Government and expressed their views in newspapers and pamphlets. For example: An antislavery Quaker corporation petitioned the First Congress, distributed pamphlets, and communicated through the press in 1790. The New York Sons of Liberty sent a circular to colonies farther south in 1766. And the Society for the Relief and Instruction of Poor Germans circulated a biweekly paper from 1755 to 1757.

The dissent says that when the Framers "constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind." That is no doubt true. All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individual men and women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears. But the individual person's right to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons. Surely the dissent does not believe that speech by the Republican Party or the Democratic Party can be censored because it is not the speech of "an individual American." It is the speech of many individual Americans, who have associated in a common cause, giving the leadership of the party the right to speak on their behalf. The association of individuals in a business corporation is no different—or at least it cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not "an individual American."

- 1. Why does this Justice argue that the original understanding of the First Amendment does not allow for limitations on the speech of associations such as corporations and unions? Do you agree?**